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Enhancing the role of accountability in
promoting the rights of beneficiaries of
development NGOs
Brendan O’Dwyer and Jeffrey Unerman*
Abstract – This paper identifies and assesses the extent to which downward accountability mechanisms in non-
governmental development organisations (NGDOs) have had the potential in practice to contribute to the effectiveness of
rights-based approaches to development. The paper draws on evidence gathered from a detailed documentary analysis and a
series of in-depth interviews undertaken with senior individuals working in the Irish NGDO sector. The analysis indicates
variations in practice with regard to the substantive implementation of key downward accountability mechanisms. The
accountability-in-practice revealed suggests that challenges to substantive implementation have arisen due to: insufficient
Irish NGDO attention to oversight of downward accountability within locally based partner NGDOs; a reluctance and/or
inability to transfer influence to locally based partner NGDOs by allowing them some influence on Irish NGDO governance
and strategy; the perceived control of locally based partner NGDOs by local elites who may be distant from, and
unrepresentative of, local communities; and a perception that locally based partner NGDOs may not require downward
accountability. Drawing on these findings, the paper makes some suggestions aimed at helping to transform the rhetorical
NGDO commitment to downward accountability into real practices that can contribute substantively to the realisation of the
key elements of the rights-based approach to development.
Keywords: accountability; downward accountability; non-governmental organisations (NGOs); development aid; rights-
based approach to development
1. Introduction
Many governments and citizens of developed
nations are committed to spending large and
increasing amounts on development aid to less
developed nations, with a key aim of lifting as many
people as possible in these countries out of extreme
poverty.1 A proportion of this multi-billion dollar
aid is channelled through the medium of non-
governmental development organisations
(NGDOs). Given the sizeable funds provided to
NGDOs, increasing attention has been paid to
ensuring that NGDOs are accountable for how they
raise and spend this money. Academic and practi-
tioner interest in NGDO accountability has tended
to focus on mechanisms for formal reporting by
NGDOs upwards to donors. However, there is
growing recognition that these formal upward
accountability mechanisms do not necessarily lead
to, and sometimes hinder, the most effective
deployment of aid funding in terms of raising as
many people as possible out of poverty. Proponents
of this view argue that the effectiveness of aid
delivery (for every $, € or £ of aid) can be enhanced
when NGDOs engage in accountability dialogues
with their beneficiaries so they can better identify,
and assess how responsive they are to, the core
needs of these beneficiaries (Agyemang et al., 2009;
Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Ebrahim, 2003a,
2003b, 2005; Kilby, 2006).
This form of accountability, interacting and
mutually learning with beneficiaries, is often
referred to as downward accountability. It empha-
sises the use of participatory approaches to assess-
ing NGDO effectiveness that centrally involve
beneficiaries, and/or their representatives, in deter-
mining NGDO priorities and assessing the out-
comes of NGDO activities from the perspective of
beneficiaries. This can involve annual participatory
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1 For example, in 2005 the European Union (EU) set a target
for Official Development Assistance (ODA) by governments to
rise to 0.56% of overall EU Gross National Income (GNI) by
2010 and then to 0.70% by 2015 (in line with EU commitments
to the United Nation’sMillenniumDevelopment Goals). In 2008
OECD member governments and multilateral agencies spent
US$134.8bn on ODA, including over US$70bn from EU
countries (OECD, 2009).
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reviews of NGDO actions undertaken in conjunc-
tion with beneficiaries as well as social accounting
(and auditing) methods which prioritise, inter alia:
beneficiary-developed needs; ongoing consultation
with beneficiaries throughout aid projects; the
development and monitoring of beneficiary-
focused complaint and response mechanisms; and
the dissemination of findings to beneficiaries. Some
large international NGDOs have developed innova-
tive downward accountability mechanisms using
techniques such as storytelling, theatre, people’s art
and song focused on improving transparency,
critical learning, and reflection in their development
work (Agyemang et al., 2009; O’Dwyer and
Unerman, 2008).
Downward accountability forms an integral part
of the rights-based approach to development – an
approach increasingly being promoted by both
NGDOs and some governments as a way to enhance
the effectiveness of aid delivery (Cornwall and
Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003;
Filmer-Wilson, 2005; Jordan and van Tuijl, 2006).
The rights-based approach focuses explicitly on
defining people’s rights in relation to various state
and non-state actors (such as NGDOs) as laid down
in international conventions and then empowering
them to claim these rights. It places particular
attention on identifying who has rights, what these
rights involve and who is obliged to ensure that
these rights are met. Empowering beneficiaries
(particularly those deemed most vulnerable) to be
the directors of their own development, through
substantive participation and partnerships with
NGDOs in development efforts, comprises a core
objective of this development approach which tends
to be justified in normative, pragmatic and ethical
terms (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004). At a
normative level the grounding of the approach in
human rights legislation is seen as politicising
certain areas of development work, particularly
efforts to enhance participation by beneficiaries in
their own development. Pragmatically, it is often
seen as a way of placing greater emphasis on the
accountability of policy makers and other actors
whose actions impact on the rights of people, such
as donors, international NGDOs and transnational
corporations. Ethically, the approach draws atten-
tion to the power dynamics in development aid,
highlighting the obligations of those involved
therein. Some scholars claim that this allows for
greater critical consideration of often proclaimed
links between participation and accountability
(Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004) and pro-
vides ‘a frame within which to signal a move
towards a more genuinely inclusive and democratic
process of popular involvement in decision making
over the resources and institutions that affect
people’s lives’ (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi,
2004: 1424). NGDO downward accountability to
beneficiaries within rights-based approaches
involves NGDOs recognising beneficiaries’ rights
within NGDO-beneficiary relationships. It also
entails NGDOs designing accountability mechan-
isms emphasising aforementioned participatory,
partnership approaches to development aimed at
enabling beneficiaries to have a meaningful role in
NGDO development projects that affect them.
Through analysing the experiences of a sample of
Irish NGDO-sector officials in implementing a
government initiative to foster greater NGDO
downward accountability, the aim of this paper is
to identify and assess the extent to which downward
accountability mechanisms are perceived to be
realising their potential in practice to contribute to
the effectiveness of rights-based approaches to
development. In addressing this aim, the paper
advances insights from prior research that has
examined NGO accountability in both the social
accountability and development studies fields. In
the social accountability literature, there is no
research that traces and evaluates the perceived
impact in practice of funder-initiated attempts at
fostering greater NGDO use of downward account-
ability mechanisms, in particular in the context of
their potential contribution towards the effective-
ness of rights-based approaches to development.
This paper addresses this research gap and offers, on
the basis of its findings, some reflections on
facilitating the development of public NGDO
funding policy in a manner that may foster more
effective deployment of aid through the rights-
based approach. More specifically, the paper
extends and advances the work of O’Dwyer and
Unerman (2007) that examined attempts to develop
a mutual accountability relationship between the
Irish government development aid funding body,
Irish Aid, and the NGDOs they fund (termed Irish
donor NGDOs), and which focused especially on
the upward accountability relationship between
Irish Aid and Irish donor NGDOs. This study, in
contrast, places its analytical emphasis on the
accountability relationship between Irish donor
NGDOs and their beneficiaries, thereby focusing
on the perceived enactment of downward account-
ability.
In the development studies literature researchers
have primarily engaged in theorising about a
perceived lack of substantive NGDO downward
accountability by NGDOs, particularly in the
context of partnership arrangements between
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 1/11/2010 04 ABR ODwyer.3d Page 452 of 472
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donor NGDOs in developed countries and locally
based NGDOs directly serving beneficiaries in
developing countries. What little empirical work
exists questions the substantive practical imple-
mentation of downward accountability while con-
tending that active donor resistance or indifference
to the substantive implementation of downward
accountability is a key reason for this limited
enactment. In contrast, this study empirically
examines perceptions of the practical implementa-
tion of downward accountability in a context where
the key NGDO donor, Irish Aid, actually required
and promoted the adoption of downward account-
ability by NGDOs as a precondition for receiving
medium-term funding.
The sample of NGDO-sector officials inter-
viewed for this study comprises senior individuals
working in the Irish NGDO sector. The Irish NGDO
context is a significant one in which to investigate
aspects of NGDO accountability and the rights-
based approach. Irish humanitarian aid delivery is
highly rated internationally (Altinger et al., 2007:
27). Ireland ranked 6th in the recent worldwide
index of humanitarian donors as a percentage of
GNP, well ahead of countries like the UK (9th) and
the US (16th) (Altinger et al., 2007). Government
funding levels have also risen rapidly in the past
decade from €157m in 1997 to €891m in 2009. This
funding was initially forecast to rise to €1.5bn per
annum by 2012 (Irish Aid, 2007), equivalent to
0.7% of forecasted GNP.2 About 20% of this
funding is channelled through Irish NGDOs (White
Paper on Irish Aid, 2005), the focus of this study.
These NGDOs also receive a significant amount of
donations (approximately 70% of total operating
income) from the public. In recent years, the Irish
government, through a funding scheme entitled
MAPS (the Multi-Annual Programme Scheme),
have sought to make continued medium-term
funding of NGDOs partly conditional upon these
NGDOs developing downward accountability
mechanisms that have the potential to contribute
to the effectiveness of rights-based approaches to
development.
The remainder of this paper is organised as
follows. Drawing on the academic literature related
to NGO accountability, Section 2 explains the
concepts of upward and downward accountability
and the potential role of downward accountability in
fostering effective rights-based approaches to
development. To provide a necessary contextual
understanding of the setting within which the
empirical NGDO accountability issues addressed
in this paper have taken place, Section 3 explains
key aspects of the Irish NGDO and development aid
sector. Prior to the presentation, interpretation and
analysis of the empirical data, Section 4 briefly
explains the main research methods used to collect
and analyse the data in this paper. The findings are
then presented in Section 5 in the form of a case
narrative tracing key aspects of the evolution of
NGDO downward accountability, partly in the
context of the Irish government MAPS initiative
to encourage greater downward accountability as
part of an effort to promote effective rights-based
approaches to development. Section 6 draws
together the key insights from the interpretive
empirical analysis, suggests possible implications
for governmental NGDO funding policy, and
indicates directions for future research arising
from this study.
2. The role of NGDO accountability
mechanisms in fostering the rights-based
approach to development
Most organisations have to deal with conflicting
demands from different sets of stakeholders.
NDGOs, however, tend to experience these
demands more acutely and regularly than private
sector organisations (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2005).
NGDOs are upwardly accountable to constituencies
such as donors, foundations, governments and other
partner NGOs –- collectively known as patrons
(Fowler, 1996; Najam, 1996). They are also down-
wardly accountable to clients/beneficiaries – groups
to whom NGDOs provide services and/or advocate
on behalf of, including communities indirectly
impacted by NGDO activities (Ebrahim 2003a).
As NGDOs have become established organisations
in development policy and practice worldwide,
more questions have been asked about their
accountability.
A key focus of increased accountability demands
in practice has been on upward accountability to
patrons, in particular to donors such as governments
and foundations. This has placed a primary focus on
accountability for resources, resource use and
immediate impacts, measuring the efficient as
opposed to the effective use of funds. However in
recent years the academic literature on NGDO
accountability (Edwards and Fowler, 2002;
Ebrahim, 2003b, 2005; Kilby, 2006), in keeping
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implemented. Irish NGDOs have been campaigning heavily
against these cuts arguing that they target some of the most
vulnerable people in the world and threaten Ireland’s reputation
as an international leader in development aid.
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with many individual NGDOs and some donors,
has argued that focusing on ensuring accountability
for the effectiveness of aid delivery should take
priority. A key part of this focus should, it is often
argued, require NGDOs to engage in downward
accountability processes with their beneficiaries so
that they can become aware of, and assess how
responsive they are to, the core needs of these
beneficiaries.
Recent trends in the nature of development work
reinforce a need to shift towards greater use of
downward accountability practices. While the
development efforts of many NGDOs based in
developed nations, who raise and channel aid
funding to NGDOs based in developing nations,
have traditionally focused on development as a need
and development work as a gift, recent changes in
development frameworks identify development
more commonly as a right with ‘the goal of
development assistance involving an obligation to
assist in [the] fulfilment of individual entitlements’
(Nelson and Dorsey, 2003: 2104). This rights-based
approach to development represents a broad con-
ceptual framework for the process of human
development, focusing explicitly on defining
people’s rights (as laid down in international
conventions) and empowering them to claim those
rights. While there is no single rights-based
approach to development, and some authors have
complained about its theoretical and practical
ambiguity (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004;
Filmer-Wilson, 2005), the United Nations claims
that most rights-based frameworks embrace the
following key elements: an express linkage to
rights; a focus on accountability by identifying
claim-holders (and their entitlements) and corres-
ponding duty-bearers (and their obligations);
empowerment where beneficiaries (claim-holders)
become the directors of development; participation
which is active, free and meaningful – in which so-
called ‘ceremonial’ contacts with beneficiaries are
deemed insufficient; and non-discrimination and
attention to vulnerable groups.3
From an accountability perspective, an effective
rights-based approach to development aims to
empower beneficiaries to assert their rights in
relation to various state and non-state actors (often
termed duty bearers) including the NGDOs who
assist them to assert these rights. The rights-based
approach emphasises the accountability of all actors
whose actions impact on the development process.
From this perspective, bilateral and multilateral
donors, NGOs and private contractors are seen as
having a duty to ensure that they respect and protect
human rights in their work. They are also required
to ensure that their programmes are locally account-
able – in other words downwardly accountable.
Accountability is therefore seen as central to
improved effectiveness and transparency of action;
facilitating monitoring of programmes and inducing
duty-bearers such as NGDOs to act. As such,
accountability is viewed as offering the potential
‘added value’ of applying rights-based approaches
to development practices (Filmer-Wilson, 2005).
The complementary concepts of accountability,
empowerment and participation central to rights-
based approaches to development are all key
features of downward accountability, thereby pla-
cing it at the core of the rights-based framework
(Fowler, 2002; Hilhorst, 2002; Nelson and Dorsey,
2003).4 By committing to rights-based approaches
to development, NGDOs accept a two-fold respon-
sibility. The first is to help beneficiaries pursue their
rights as claim-holders in relation to non-NGDO
constituencies (or duty bearers). The second
involves NGDOs recognising beneficiary rights to
hold NGDOs accountable for the nature of their
activities and NGDOs’ acceptance of their duty-
bearer role in relation to beneficiaries. Embracing
downward accountability mechanisms focused on
minimising, as far as possible, power differentials
and establishing participatory partnership arrange-
ments with local NGDOs and their beneficiaries is
central to the fulfilment of this duty. Ideally, this
should enable beneficiaries to design, develop and
implement programmes and projects in conjunction
with NGDOs whereby they are heavily involved in
identifying their own development objectives.
Certain issues relevant to the above trends in
NGDO accountability have been addressed at both
a theoretical and an empirical level in the social
accountability and development studies literatures.
The social accountability literature has examined
the emergence and impact of accountability mech-
anisms in various individual NGDO settings (Dixon
et al., 2006; Goddard and Assad, 2006; O’Dwyer
and Unerman, 2008) and certain aspects of the
nature of the accountability relationships between
funders and NGDOs (Dixon et al., 2006; O’Dwyer
and Unerman, 2007). Some work has also theorised
the extent to which NGDOs should be held
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or espoused by The World Bank and The United Nations,
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Department for International Development (DFID). Numerous
development NGDOs such as Oxfam and ActionAid
International have also adopted the approach (Bradley, 2007).
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accountable for their actions (Unerman and
O’Dwyer, 2006). Much of this research highlights
a focus in NGDO accountability discourse, practice
and research on narrow, financially oriented
accountability to donors which, it is argued, often
comes at the expense of the potential to learn
through downward accountability to beneficiaries.
There is, however, an absence of research seeking to
trace and evaluate the perceived impact in practice
of attempts to foster greater NGDO use of down-
ward accountability mechanisms, in particular in
the context of their potential contribution towards
the effectiveness of rights-based approaches to
development. This paper addresses this research
gap.
The development studies literature has beenmore
explicitly exercised by the issue of downward
accountability implementation, albeit rarely in the
context of implementing rights-based approaches to
development and with a primarily theoretical as
opposed to empirical focus (see Atack, 1999;
Kamat, 2004). Much of this work supports the call
by Kilby (2006) for careful evaluation of the
effective implementation of downward account-
ability given suspicions that actual downward
accountability practices may often be at variance
with downward accountability ideals. For example,
the theoretical work of Kamat (2004) on the role of
NGOs in the democratisation of civil society has
highlighted concerns at perceived shifts on the
ground away from idealised participatory partner-
ship and empowerment programmes consistent
with downward accountability ideals towards
more managerial, technical assessments of the
needs and capacities of aid beneficiaries. This, he
argues, is partly due to a trend in local community-
based NGDOs where professionally trained staff
drawn from established sectors of local societies
have replaced those ‘who identified closely with the
poor, were committed to social justice work at the
grassroots . . . [and] . . . were conscious of the need
to deprofessionalise in order to build relations with
the poor’ (Kamat, 2004: 168). Kamat (2004: 167–
168) attributes this trend to World Bank assess-
ments that NGDOs would only make viable part-
ners for their donor agencies if they enhanced their
managerial and technical capabilities.
Kilby (2006) studied 15 local Indian NGOs
focusing on empowerment outcomes for poor
women as a result of NGDO engagements and the
role that NGDO values and downward account-
ability played in these outcomes. He discovered that
while the NGOs studied felt that downward
accountability was a potentially important part of
measuring programme effectiveness, it was not a
central feature of their accountability in practice as
they were wary of becoming ‘beholden to a
particular, and arguably, narrow constituency’
(Kilby, 2006: 957). Within local partnership
arrangements, Kilby (2006) found that while
Northern donor NGDOs allowed beneficiaries
some level of participation this failed to translate
into ‘ ‘‘representation’’ in a strict accountability
sense’ (p. 957) with most accountability mechan-
isms being entirely informal thereby, according to
Kilby (2006), failing to establish rights for benefi-
ciaries as part of the accountability process. In
Kilby’s (2006) case, while key donors did not
actively deter NGDOs from focusing on downward
accountability in the form of partnership arrange-
ments, they explicitly prioritised financial account-
ability focused on efficiency. A further case study
by Lister (2000), while not directly examining
downward accountability, found that strict funding
requirements imposed by a funder in a primary
health project allied to a lack of perceived local
NGDO expertise led to a donor NGDO ignoring
local partners in the design and implementation of
the project despite initially committing to doing so;
while a broad analysis of the impact of government
funding on NGDOs’ accountability by Edwards and
Hulme (1996) also stressed a tendency for donor
funding requirements to reorient accountability
away from local NGDO partners.
A number of key issues emerge from the prior
development studies literature. First, the implemen-
tation of downward accountability mechanisms,
while now widely espoused, has not been subject to
much study at an empirical level and, in the rare
instances where studies of this nature have been
attempted, downward accountability has not been
examined in the context of its role in the imple-
mentation of rights-based approaches to develop-
ment. Second, the limited empirical work that exists
supports theoretical suspicions questioning the
extent of the implementation of downward account-
ability. Third, donor/funder resistance or indiffer-
ence to downward accountability in their own
accountability requirements is offered as a key
factor limiting the practical realisation of downward
accountability. This study is unique in that it
empirically examines perceptions of the practical
implementation of downward accountability as part
of a rights-based approach to development in a
context where the key NGDO donor/funder actually
required and promoted the adoption of downward
accountability by funded NGDOs. This is distinct
from the development studies literature reviewed
above which mainly engages in theorising as
opposed to empirically examining how downward
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accountability operates, or addresses the issue of
downward accountability, often as a peripheral part
of broader studies, in contexts where there is active
donor/funder resistance or indifference to its sub-
stantive implementation. This Irish context of the
study in this paper therefore differs substantively
from the contexts within which the small number of
prior empirical studies into the implementation of
downward accountability have been conducted.
3. The Irish NGDO context
Within the Irish context, Irish Aid is the government
of Ireland’s programme of assistance to developing
countries. The programme’s main objective is the
reduction of poverty, inequality and exclusion in
developing countries. Irish Aid works in co-oper-
ation with governments in other countries, other
donors, NGDOs and international organisations as
part of the global effort to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.5 The Irish NGDO sector is
dominated by three large NGDOs who broadly
concentrate on improving the plight of the poor in
so-called developing nations. They comprise
Concern Worldwide with total income of €116m
in 2007 (Concern, 2008), Trócaire, which is the
overseas development agency of the Catholic
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 1/11/2010 04 ABR ODwyer.3d Page 456 of 472
Table 1
Members of Dóchas
ActionAid Ireland
Afri
Aidlink
Amnesty International – Irish Section
Bóthar
Centre for Global Education
ChildFund Ireland
Children in Crossfire
Christian Aid Ireland
Church Mission Society Ireland (CMSI)
Comhlámh
Concern Worldwide
Galway One World Centre
Gorta
Irish League of Credit Unions – International Development Foundation
Irish Commission for Justice and Social Affairs (ICJSA)
Irish Council for International Students (ICOS)
Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA)
Irish Foundation for Cooperative Development (IFCD)
Irish Missionary Union (IMU)
Irish Red Cross
Kerry Action for Development Education (KADE)
Oxfam-Ireland
Plan Ireland
Self Help Development International
Skillshare International Ireland
SUAS Educational Development
The Hope Foundation
Trócaire
Vita (formerly Refugee Trust International)
Voluntary Service International (VSI)
Voluntary Service Overseas (Ireland)
Volunteer Missionary Movement (VMM)
War on Want NI
Wingspread International
World Vision Ireland
5 The Millennium Development Goals targets, agreed by the
UN at a series of international summit meetings, identify some
of the main causes of extreme poverty in today’s world and
underpin the poverty reduction policies and activities of Irish
Aid. The Millennium Development Goals require the inter-
national community to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality
and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal
health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure
environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership
for development.
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Church, with total income of €60m in 2007–2008
(Trócaire, 2008a), and GOAL with total income of
€59m in 2006 (GOAL, 2007). Both Trócaire and
Concern have traditionally been less focused on
emergency relief than GOAL. The next level of
medium-sized NGDOs operate on annual incomes
of around €5m to €17m. These include Oxfam
Ireland with total 2007–2008 income €17m (Oxfam
Ireland, 2008), World Vision Ireland with total
2006–2007 income €8.2m (World Vision, 2008)
and Christian Aid Ireland; while a large cluster of
smaller NGDOs operate on annual incomes of
€0.5m to €2m.
The Irish NGDO sector is represented by an
umbrella body called Dóchas, which provides a
forum for consultation and co-operation between its
NGDO members (see Table 1). It is not a funding
agency and does not participate in overseas pro-
jects. Nine NGDOs make up Dóchas’ board
including representatives from two of the three
large NGDOs (Trócaire and Concern).6 Dóchas’
key aim is to develop strategic alliances in order to
combat poverty and global injustice. A strategic
relationship with Irish Aid is central to this object-
ive. This relationship is governed by the terms of a
three-year Memorandum of Understanding (cover-
ing 2006 to 2009) which seeks to ‘develop and
mould a genuine partnership relationship, which
facilitates a frank, appropriately balanced and
mutually respectful relationship between Dóchas
and Irish Aid’. (Dóchas, 2007: 5). As part of the
three-year partnership agreement, Irish Aid pro-
vides Dóchas with financial support, amounting to
65% of Dóchas’ income in 2008 (Dóchas, 2008),
and works with Dóchas to shape the mechanisms
for policy dialogue between Irish Aid and the
NGDO community. One of the key areas in this
dialogue has been the nature of accountability
relationships between NGDOs, Irish Aid (as a
funder of the NGDOs), and the beneficiaries of
NGDO services – with an aim of fostering, and
realising the benefits of, greater downward account-
ability. Among the envisaged benefits is the poten-
tial for more effective realisation of rights-based
approaches to development.
In 2003 Irish Aid launched a major initiative
(denoted MAPS – the Multi-Annual Programme
Scheme) linking large-scale, medium-term NGDO
funding from the Irish government to the adoption
of forms of downward accountability focused on
assessing the extent to which NGDOs deliver
benefits to their ultimate beneficiaries. This initia-
tive promoted a partnership approach to the delivery
of overseas development aid at two distinct levels.
At one level it promoted a partnership relationship
to aid delivery between Irish Aid and funded
NGDOs which focused on mutual learning and
dialogue. This formed the key focus of prior
academic work by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007)
whose findings suggested that this initiative, albeit
in its early stages, had largely failed to establish this
hoped-for partnership relationship. At the other
level, the initiative promoted the development of
‘local’ partnership relationships between funded
NGDOs and locally based NGDOs and beneficiar-
ies in developing nations. This part of the initiative
emphasised the development of strong downward
accountability relationships as an element of its
rights-based focus on ‘strengthening the capacity of
people in the developing world to pursue their
human, economic and social rights’ (Irish Aid,
2008). This study places its analytical emphasis on
this aspect of ‘local’ partnership relationships
promoted within MAPS, focusing on how the
nature and extent of its adoption has facilitated
downward accountability as part of the rights-based
approach.
4. Research methods
The main source of evidence in this paper derives
from 12 in-depth semi-structured interviews held
over a six-month period with key senior individuals
working within the Irish NGDO sector (see Table 2)
and an extensive analysis of several documentary
sources.7 The documents analysed included indi-
vidual NGDO and Dóchas annual reports from
2004 to 2008, NGDO, Irish Aid and Dóchas
strategy and policy documents, Irish government
publications on development aid, print media
coverage and press releases of Irish Aid, Dóchas
and the interviewee NGDOs from January 2004 to
August 2008, and external consultant evaluations of
MAPS.
Eight of the 12 interviews were held with senior
‘executives’ in NGDOs. The interviewees included
individuals from all three of the largest NGDOs,
three from the medium-sized NGDOs, and two
from smaller NGDOs. Seven of the eight NGDOs
represented by interviewees were on the board of
Dóchas (on which nine NGDOs sit in total). The
remaining interviews were conducted with: senior
members of Irish Aid and Dóchas, a senior official
in the main Irish support organisation for develop-
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6 The third large NGDO, GOAL, is not a member of Dóchas.
7 The interviewees were guaranteed, as far as possible,
anonymity in the writing up process. Hence, separate inter-
viewees are denoted by the letters A to L throughout the
narrative in the next section, rather than being identified by
name or organisation.
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ment aid workers, and a thought leader in Irish
development education (termed ‘the education
leader’ in the case narrative). The thought leader
led one of the main education programmes in
development studies in Ireland and had written on
issues surrounding NGO accountability just prior to
her interview. Given her knowledge and extensive
experience within the development aid sector she
was deemed an essential, informed source of
insights on the issues we wished to investigate.
In advance of their interview, all interviewees
were sent an outline of issues surrounding NGDO
accountability which were to be discussed. Each
interview lasted between 45minutes and 90minutes
and was tape-recorded and fully transcribed. The
interviews aimed to initiate a discussion about how
interviewees perceived the evolution of account-
ability in the Irish NGDO sector, and why they felt it
was developing in the manner they perceived (King,
1999; Lillis, 1999; Patton, 2002; Denzin and
Lincoln, 2003).
Post-interview analysis focused on organising
the interview evidence into an initial thick descrip-
tion of the findings. The initial themes were
developed by one author and grouped under a
number of overarching themes (sometimes called
‘axial’ codes (Parker and Roffey, 1997: 228))
depicting relationships among the initial themes
(‘open’ codes) identified in the thick description
(O’Dwyer, 2004). Links and inconsistencies
between these overarching themes were then iden-
tified to flesh out a broad initial ‘story’.8 While this
initial analysis of themes was conducted by one
author in conjunction with the analysis of docu-
mentary evidence, it was refined and re-focused
several times through several re-analyses of the
overall data set undertaken independently by both
authors. This uncovered further more refined
themes which were agreed among the authors and
were used to structure a narrative from the data for
this paper.9 This narrative traces the practical
development of greater downward accountability
within NGDOs as part of a commitment to imple-
menting the rights-based approach to development.
It also highlights the appreciation by these NGDOs
of the importance of greater downward account-
ability for the realisation of more effective aid
delivery through rights-based approaches to devel-
opment and considers the extent to which this
importance is perceived to have been reflected in
NGDO practice. This forms the key focus of the
case analysis presented in the next section.
5. Case analysis
This section presents, interprets and analyses the
empirical interview and documentary data. The
analysis initially reveals how attention to the
effectiveness of aid delivery has emerged from
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 1/11/2010 04 ABR ODwyer.3d Page 458 of 472
Table 2
Interviewees
NGDO size Number of interviewees and designation
Large 3 interviewees (designated A, B and C)
Medium 3 interviewees (designated D, E and F)
Small 2 interviewees (designated G and H)
Other primary players in Irish
NGDO sector
Number of interviewees and designation
Dóchas; Irish Aid; ‘Thought
leader’ in Irish development
education (termed ‘education
leader’); Head of development aid
workers’ support organisation
4 interviewees (designated I, J, K and L)
8 The NGDO-Irish Aid accountability relationship, which is
the focus of the aforementioned study by O’Dwyer and
Unerman (2007) evolved as a second key ‘story’ from elements
of the data analysed for this study. However, the narrative and
focus of the O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) paper evolved
primarily from analysing documentary data not directly relevant
to this paper. While the interviews forming part of the data
analysed for this paper also formed part of the data analysed for
the O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) study they comprised a
relatively minor part of the data analysed in the latter study
compared to this study where they comprise a significant core of
the data analysed.
9 This refined focus was also influenced by reviewers of this
paper who made several helpful suggestions as to how we
should focus and re-frame our analysis. This meant revisiting
the original narrative we drew from our initial themes, re-
organising and re-interrogating these themes and re-interpreting
their significance. This involved re-examining all of the initial
data analysis and the individual interview transcripts underpin-
ning this analysis several times.
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several sources – including the Irish government,
the print media and the aforementioned MAPS
guidelines. It proceeds to examine how widespread
NGDO commitments to the rights-based approach
to development, in response to this concern for
effectiveness, have been coupled with commit-
ments to adopt downward accountability mechan-
isms – a central feature of MAPS. The downward
accountability promise promoted within the rights-
based approach, particularly the enactment of
‘local’ partnerships between Irish donor NGDOs
and local NGDOs, is then further scrutinised and
shown to be struggling in places to fully realise its
perceived potential. The perceived reasons for these
apparent struggles are subsequently explored.
5.1. The emergence of a focus on accountability for
effectiveness
A combination of an Irish government White Paper
on Irish Aid, Irish Aid’sMAPS process (as explored
in O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007), greater media
debate, public uncertainty about the effectiveness of
development assistance,10 and an Irish government
Public Accounts Committee Interim Report assess-
ing expenditure on Irish Aid (see: Cullen, 2005;
Committee of Public Accounts, 2008) have priori-
tised assessing the effectiveness of aid delivery by
Irish-funded NGDOs. This has forced NGDOs to
embrace accountability for effectiveness more
explicitly, with the Dóchas director, for example,
publicly encouraging greater scrutiny of effective-
ness. Moreover, both he and senior directors in
Trócaire have engaged in a highly public and
sometimes rancorous debate with the Director of
GOAL over the ideal way to deliver aid to ensure
what they term ‘maximum accountability’ for its
effectiveness is achieved (see, Meehan, 2008;
O’Shea, 2008).
These debates also involved the then Irish
Minister of State for Development Co-operation
and Human Rights writing publicly in response to
the issues discussed, particularly in defence of Irish
Aid’s strategy of channelling aid in co-operation
with foreign governments. Trócaire were also
publicly critical of progress on the Paris
Declaration11 principles of ownership and account-
ability bemoaning, inter alia, the Declaration’s
apparent prioritisation of the efficiency of aid
delivery over its effectiveness (Trocaire, 2007: 3).
Several of the interviewees in this study argued
that downward accountability needed to be
embraced and encouraged by Irish NGDOs if the
benefits of rights-based approaches were to be fully
realised in terms of improved effectiveness of aid
delivery. The case narrative that follows critically
analyses how two central complementary charac-
teristics of the Irish NGDO environment, the
conceptual commitment to downward accountabil-
ity within the rights-based approach and the adop-
tion of local partnership models of aid delivery by
individual NGDOs have been instrumental in
supporting claims of Irish NGDOs to embrace
downward accountability as part of the rights-based
approach.
The next subsection examines the way in which
apparent allegiances to a rights-based approach to
development at a macro level, and to a comple-
mentary local partnership approach to aid delivery
at a micro level, as promoted within MAPS, have
been perceived as requiring a demonstrable com-
mitment to downward accountability. The succeed-
ing subsection reveals perspectives examining the
extent to which the rhetoric employed in promoting
these local partnership and rights-based approaches
is translating into actual downward accountability
practice.
5.2. Debating the role of downward accountability
within rights-based approaches to development
As a focus on effectiveness of aid delivery has
developed, increased debates about the importance
of downward accountability for a successful rights-
based approach have emerged – both within Irish
Aid as part of the MAPS funding requirements, and
among Irish donor NGDOs themselves. In the early
2000s, in commonwith international trends (Nelson
and Dorsey, 2003), Dóchas commenced actively
promoting a rights-based approach to development
among its members, organising a number of
seminars and publishing a report mapping mem-
bers’ engagement with the rights-based approach
(Kenny, 2004). It also issued a paper on NGO
accountability (Leen, 2006) highlighting the need to
pay greater attention to downward accountability.
Furthermore, it established a working group to
examine experiences of downward accountability
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10 A 2005 survey by Irish Aid found that 20% of Irish people
did not know if development assistance was making a difference
(White Paper on Irish Aid, 2005).
11 The Paris Declaration is a major international agreement
aimed at increasing efforts to harmonise, align and manage aid
for more effective results. It established a set of monitorable
actions and indicators to which over 100 Ministers, Heads of
Agencies and other Senior Officials adhered and committed
their countries and organisations to (see High Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness, 2005). The declaration was endorsed on
2 March 2005 and lays down a roadmap aimed at improving the
quality of aid and its impact on development. The 56 partnership
commitments are organised around five key principles of:
ownership: alignment; harmonization; managing for results; and
mutual accountability.
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elsewhere, to inform the Dóchas membership and
Dóchas’ ongoing consultations with Irish Aid.
The emergence of this focus on downward
accountability was perceived by several interview-
ees as necessary if the adoption of the rights-based
approach by many Dóchas members in the mid-
2000s was to have been as effective as possible.
Interviewees from NGDOs of all sizes pointed to
adoption of the rights-based approach as a key
catalyst for NGDO accountability focusing more
now on beneficiaries, as it apparently helped
beneficiaries to ‘campaign and advocate for their
own rights’ (D) thereby increasing NGDO ‘field-
work effectiveness’ (D).
According to the Dóchas interviewee, the rights-
based approach addressed the root causes of poverty
revolving around power relationships, thereby
inevitably prioritising beneficiary perspectives and
needs in NGDO accountability. While he accepted
that ‘there [wa]s often a clear power relationship in
favour of aid workers relative to beneficiaries’ (J),
he argued that attention to the rights-based
approach, where NGDOs raised awareness of
beneficiary rights and used rights-based language
as an integral part of their projects or programmes,
was a key means to erode this power imbalance. It
could also facilitate the downward accountability
that was necessary for an effective rights-based
approach by encouraging local communities to hold
NGDOs (as well as others) to account.
While Dóchas’ public commitments to down-
ward accountability as part of the rights-based
approach provided an impression of unity in NGDO
perspectives, there were several inter-NGDO ten-
sions belying this apparent consensus. First, leaders
of some smaller NGDOs, and the education leader,
while sympathetic to the broad aims of the rights-
based approach, questioned what they perceived as
a rather naïve view of the power relationships
between NGDOs and beneficiaries promoted within
the approach as conceptualised by the Dóchas
interviewee. They felt that Dóchas and Irish Aid
were guilty of appropriating concepts central to the
rights-based approach, such as participation and
empowerment, and sanitising them somewhat ‘in
order to give them [Dóchas and Irish Aid] some
simple criteria upon which to base their work
thereby giving them leverage when they [we]re
looking for increased government funding’ (L).
These interviewees argued that the rights-based
approach could not foster the necessary downward
accountability unless it moved away from its
reformist roots and embraced more radical forms
of aid delivery which, among other things, chal-
lenged corrupt governments – something they felt
larger NGDOs, MAPS funded NGDOs and Dóchas
were reluctant to embrace. The notion in the rights-
based approach that NGDOs could bestow power
on those without power was seen as particularly
naïve and akin to a fundamental paradox as it was a
clear display of power itself. In response to probing,
these interviewees acknowledged that their views
had an explicitly ideological focus in that they were
often frustrated that ‘Dóchas was moving too much
towards a situation [where it was] largely [a] service
contractor for the [Irish] state’ (L) which they felt
prevented a more radical discussion of the role and
accountability of NGDOs in civil society. However,
while expressing these strongly felt views they
explicitly acknowledged that the adoption of the
rights-based approach, albeit in what they viewed as
an overly reformist manner, did represent a more
beneficiary-focused perspective which potentially
moved attention away from highly paternalistic
‘charity model[s]’ (K) of aid delivery.
Second, the apparent unity of commitment and
interpretation implied by Dóchas’ pronouncements
on the rights-based approach clouded some tensions
between larger and other NGDOswithin the Dóchas
structure. For example, while the Dóchas director
has commented on issues surrounding NGDO
accountability on behalf of Dóchas members in
the print media, the director of Trócaire, itself a
member of and a key funder within Dóchas, has a
much higher public profile and is found more
commonly speaking out publicly on similar issues,
sometimes from a different perspective. A per-
ceived ‘control of the airwaves’ (K) by top-tier
NGDO leaders visibly annoyed our two smaller
NGDO interviewees as they felt it potentially
undermined Dóchas-led positions on issues, how-
ever flawed. Moreover, two of our top-tier inter-
viewees appeared indifferent about the role of
Dóchas.
One interviewee indicated that his NGDO was
only a member of Dóchas ‘to show broad solidarity
with them’ (C) and proceeded to claim that ‘in some
cases we will go in to influence Dóchas policy . . .
[but] the feeling I have is that Dóchas is not a
particularly effective body’ (C). Another top-tier
interviewee indicated, in contrast, that he was
conscious that his NGDO was a major financial
contributor to Dóchas which meant that his NGDO
was careful not to be too opinionated within
Dóchas, while working in other fora to obtain
influence. These perspectives questioned, at least to
some extent, the nature of larger NGDOs’ commit-
ment to unified Dóchas-led positions on issues such
as the role of downward accountability within the
rights-based approach.
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The Dóchas interviewee was keen to challenge
the two smaller NGDO and education leaders’
claims about the ubiquity of the power imbalance
between NGDOs and beneficiaries within the
rights-based approach. In his work with a number
of international and Irish NGDOs, he claimed that
power relationships were much more complex and
that power could often rest with local communities.
He recounted his experience of a village in India
where villagers had numerous NGDOs working on
their behalf and competing with each other to
provide assistance to the villagers. The villagers set
up quasi-committees which targeted NGDOs that
they knew had to distribute aid, thereby maximising
the amount of aid they could attain:
‘I think local communities are clever enough to
know that if they want money out of the NGO
system they know how to milk it. They know that
there are a million NGOs out there and if the
NGOs don’t satisfy the communities’wishes they
can go to another NGO. In fact there may be too
many NGOs, which actually challenges who
really possesses the power in many circum-
stances.’ (J)
He also acknowledged that while there were
some unavoidably differing views between larger
and smaller NGDOs within the Dóchas structure on
the empowerment possibilities of downward
accountability, these were far from unique to the
Irish context and merely required careful con-
sensus-based management.
In summary, the potential contribution and role of
downward accountability as a central feature of the
rights-based approach to development was broadly
supported by all interviewees. However, some
interviewees felt that the overly reformist concep-
tualisations emanating from Dóchas and Irish Aid
were somewhat simplistic and needed greater focus
on changing structures in developing countries if
they were to empower beneficiaries. Moreover, the
unified front presented by Dóchas on this issue in
particular betrayed some tensions between large and
small NGDOs within the Dóchas structure which
questioned larger NGDOs’ substantive commitment
toDóchas’ perspective on downward accountability
within the rights-based approach. Despite these
differences, which were primarily influenced by
ideological and organisation-specific concerns,
Dóchas, the Irish Aid MAPS requirements, and all
of our interviewees endorsed (albeit to varying
degrees) the potential contribution of downward
accountability within the rights-based approach. A
central feature of these macro-level perspectives
was an explicit recognition of the need to partner
with local NGDOs on projects and programmes,
something all NGDO leaders interviewed claimed
to be committed to. This issue of local partnerships,
also central to the MAPS requirements, and its
implications for downward accountability within
the rights-based approach, is now discussed in order
to assess the extent to which the above commit-
ments and accompanying concerns are perceived to
have been reflected within NGDO practice.
5.3 Local partnership models in the rights-based
approach – the role of downward accountability
While the adoption of the rights-based approach
was widely, although not universally, seen as
contributing to and requiring the furthering of
downward accountability at a strategic level, at the
micro-operational level Irish NGDO partnership
arrangements with local NGDOs and beneficiaries
(where possible) were seen as facilitating the
transformation of the key strategic level elements
of the rights-based approach, such as accountability
and empowerment, into practice.
Consistent with theMAPS requirements, all large
and several medium-sized and small Irish NGDOs
at the time of this study claimed to have moved to
operate through local partnership approaches
embracing key aspects of rights-based approaches
to development. These moves involved partnering
with locally based NGDOs in developing countries
to deliver aid. For example, Trócaire emphasises
how its local NGDO partners ‘work with [local]
communities to identify their needs and . . . help
them devise solutions to th[eir] difficulties’
(Trócaire, 2008b). However, analysis of the data
in this study suggests that the structure and
enactment of local partnership relationships by
many Irish NGDOs varies, and affords different
levels of attention to downward accountability. A
number of perceived reasons for this were
uncovered. These included: insufficient Irish
NGDO attention to oversight of downward account-
ability within locally based NGDOs; a reluctance
and/or inability to transfer influence to locally based
NGDOs by allowing them some influence on Irish
NGDO governance and strategy; the control of local
partner NGDOs by local elites who could some-
times be distant from, and unrepresentative of, local
communities; and a perception that local partner
NGDOs did not require downward accountability.
These reasons are discussed in more depth in the
following four subsections.
5.3.1. Insufficient local NGDO oversight
Despite the macro-strategic level commitments
explained above, and an acceptance that ‘local’
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partner models could possibly promote connected-
ness with local communities and recognition of
beneficiary rights, there was some concern that
these local partner models were often in practice
operating at too much of a distance. This was
perceived to be especially problematic in terms of
how local communities could hold both local
partner NGDOs and the Irish donor NGDOs
accountable, and was linked to the aforementioned
concerns of three interviewees about the naïve view
of power embraced in the rights-based approach
promoted by Dóchas. It was claimed that not
enough pressure was placed on local NGDO
partners to demonstrate accountability to commu-
nities and that downward accountability on the part
of local NGDOs was often presumed or simply not
addressed by many Irish donor NGDOs. Most large
and medium-sized NGDO leaders acknowledged
that direct oversight of local partners with respect to
downward accountability in the rights-based
approach was lacking, but some defended their
relatively distanced approach on the grounds of its
impracticality. Others claimed that their approach,
while far from perfect, was more engaged with local
partners than might initially be apparent, and
provided examples to support this.
Exemplifying the former perspective, an inter-
viewee (D) from a medium-sized NGDO admitted
that while his NGDO worked primarily through
local NGDO partners, its beneficiary-focused
accountability was poorly developed and needed
improvement as his NGDO did not press local
NGDO partners on this issue. Another MAPS-
funded interviewee from a medium-sized NGDO
acknowledged that while his NGDO ‘presumed to
act on behalf of what [they] call[ed] [their] ‘‘part-
ners’’ in the Third World’, their ‘downstream
accountability’ (F) through their local NGDO part-
ners was significantly underdeveloped. Apparently,
little thought had been given to this ‘as the risks of
losing funding’ (F) as a consequence seemed
remote despite the MAPS requirements. However,
he felt strongly that his NGDO needed to focus
much more on ensuring that ‘those whose lives we
are affecting [have] . . . a proper say and a proper
sense of ownership in [the NGDO’s] work’ (F).
The Irish Aid interviewee also recounted that
while working as an aid worker in India for a donor
NGDO she had to constantly cajole local partner
NGDOs to develop deeper relationships with com-
munities to ensure that the communities could
influence how resources were being used and were
satisfied with their usage:
‘I know when I worked in India, I worked with
[name of large NGDO] at the time and I
remember distinctly saying that to the NGO
partners, you should absolutely be able to go in
and say ‘‘this is the kind of money that we have
and this is what we are spending it on’’ and see if
that is what they would spend it on, what do they
have to say about that, enter into negotiation
around it. It is not simply a case that whatever the
community says goes but at least you should
enter into a debate with them and provide the
rationale for why you are allocating resources in
this way or that way, particularly when you get
those resources on their behalf.’ (K)
However, she admitted that this form of oversight
of local NGDOs was not commonly practised
among her then peers. When probed as to the
possible reasons for this neglect, she indicated that
some Irish donor NGDOs may have been wary of
their legitimacy in the eyes of local NGDOs given
that these donor NGDOs were often not directly
engaged with their supposed key constituency, the
beneficiary. This, she argued, made them cautious
about pressing local NGDOs on their own down-
ward accountability, especially as many local
NGDOs were beginning to challenge donor
NGDOs with regard to the focus they imposed on
local NGDOs without in-depth knowledge of local
conditions:
‘There is pressure coming on donor NGDOs from
local NGDOs who are questioning why Northern
NGOs should come in with resources and use
those resources on expensive expatriate person-
nel or on structures or systems that are not
necessarily appropriate to the local situation.’ (K)
For some leaders of large and medium-sized
NGDOs, this issue of weak local NGDO oversight
did not appear to be a fundamental concern. For
example, when probed on this issue, a leader of a
medium-sized NGDO countered that his NGDOs’
local partner NGDOs were often local community
groups and were therefore about as close as you
could possibly get to beneficiaries. He claimed that
his NGDO had a legal contract with these local
partners through which he could be at least
somewhat satisfied that consideration of beneficiary
perspectives was addressed:
‘Every partner we have, we have a legal contract
with them that defines the relationship, which
defines what we will do and they will do and also
defines a programme of monitoring, reporting
etc. both in terms of financial accounting and also
general evaluation with respect to beneficiaries.
We are comfortable with that and we require our
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partners to be externally audited annually as well.
In [name of African country] where we have a
good chunk of our programme, for example,
there is a local legal system of registration of
NGOs. In fact, about 18 months ago, we actually
opened a little office in [name of African country]
to get closer to our partners there.’ (E)
He acknowledged that ideally his NGDO could
get closer to beneficiaries but argued that what they
were currently doing was sufficient.
An interviewee from a large NGDO, while
acknowledging that his NGDO could ideally
address beneficiaries more directly, was dismissive
of suggestions of a lack of oversight of local
NGDOs in their downward accountability. He
staunchly defended his NGDO by referring to
their ‘model built up over thirty-one years’ (A)
which had ‘a network of local partners working with
communities who developed project proposals
within these communities which they assessed and
then funded’ (A). He contended that they could
place complete faith in this model and trust in their
partners without the need to actively check the
extent of local partners’ engagement with ultimate
beneficiaries. He appeared somewhat sensitive to
probing on this issue as prior to discussing it he had
recounted how his NGDO had previously been
publicly accused, in a report written by one of our
smaller NGDO interviewees, of not having written
policies on beneficiary participation in place that
allowed his NGDO to assess, inter alia, the real
extent of beneficiary influence over the local NGDO
projects his NGDO funded.
A leader of a medium-sized NGDO explained
that a contributing factor to his NGDO’s lack of
detailed local partner oversight was the fact that
while many local NGDOs are termed partners by
donor NGDOs, these local NGDOs did not actually
see themselves as partners. They often received
funding from six or seven other donor NGDOs and
merely viewed a particular donor NGDO as one of
many funders. Hence, he claimed that his NGDO
did not expend significant effort on assessing the
local NGDOs’ accountability to beneficiaries as it
would prove difficult to analyse and would likely be
resisted by local NGDOs who were often not
heavily dependent on them for funding:
‘He [a local NGDO leader] didn’t refer to us as
partners because for him in reality he has about
six or seven funders and we are just one of them.
We see him as our partner and they [the local
NGDO] are happy to go along with that language
and we don’t intrude too much and they are [also]
happy to have it to the extent that it works for
them.’ (D)
While critical of larger NGDOs’ oversight of
local NGDOs, one leader of a small NGDO
admitted that being small possibly meant that
relative to larger NGDOs her NGDO could more
easily ‘keep a close eye on everything and know
better the extent to which local communities were
involved in project design and delivery’ (H) with
local NGDOs:
‘The truth is, and this is dreadful, I don’t know if
we were ten times the size we are now, would we
be able to do what we do? One of the beauties
about being small is that you can keep an eye on
everything, you know where stuff is coming and
going and how beneficiaries are involved with
local partners. You can talk to your donors – your
private donors and your public donors with
absolute confidence on that issue. It is easy to
keep an eye on ten projects, you know what I
mean?’ (H)
This point was partly reiterated by another leader
from a medium-sized NGDO who indicated how,
while his NGDO struggled at times to ensure direct
beneficiary involvement, they were still small
enough to attempt to get directly involved with
local communities by working on the ground with
their local partners where possible. He emphasised
the control they tried to ensure that local commu-
nities had over all aspects of the local NGDO work
they funded, from design through to ultimate
assessment of impacts which gave them ‘a complete
sense of ownership of projects’ (E) which local
partner NGDOs fully respected.
In summary, most NGDOs appeared to perform
somewhat distant oversight over the engagement of
local partner NGDOs with their beneficiaries, albeit
to varying degrees. While some larger NGDO
leaders questioned whether this was a significant
problem given their long established partnership
models, other interviewees acknowledged that more
attention could be given to the issue but highlighted
the practical difficulties of doing so. Moreover, it
was stressed that local NGDOs who were not
especially dependent on donor NGDOs for funding
might also not welcome greater oversight of this
nature from donor funders.
5.3.2. Resistance to transferring influence over
governance to locally based NGDOs
While the previous subsection reveals varying,
although often quite limited, levels of direct donor
NGDO oversight over local NGDO beneficiary
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engagement, some large and medium-sized
NGDOs, despite much public rhetoric, also
appeared quite reluctant to allow local partner
NGDOs significant influence in their governance,
focus and decision-making. For example, the
documentary analysis undertaken as part of this
study uncovered no evidence of substantive local
NGDO partner involvement in the governance
structures of any of the NGDOs interviewed.
Interviewees from medium-sized and top-tier
NGDOs also referred to explicit reluctance within
their organisations to embracing participation
aimed at giving local NGDO partners or benefi-
ciaries an input into their NGDO’s focus and
activities as part of their local partner models.
Some regretted this, while others were adamant that
given other more pressing governance concerns
‘this level of complication in governance was
simply not necessary’ (D).
One of the interviewees from a medium-sized
NGDO was initially quite concerned about this
issue when he commenced working at his NGDO.
He recounted asking his international director at his
induction meeting how local NGDO partners could
have a more direct role in the NGDO’s governance
structure. The director responded that it would
happen ‘over [his] dead body’ (F) as he felt it was
not what local partner NGDOs or ultimate benefi-
ciaries ‘needed or wanted’ (F). The interviewee felt
that his director privileged ‘the rootedness of [the
NGDO] in Ireland’ (F) and that the director
perceived several practical difficulties especially
as there might have been:
‘ . . . a conflict of interest in putting one particular
beneficiary from some country on our board.
Howwould they be chosen? Dowe just decide on
a few tame ones that we like?’ (F)
Another interviewee from a medium-sized
NGDO insisted that there was little to be learned
from local NGDO partners and that they should
merely do the work they were instructed to do – in
complete contrast to the local partner rhetoric
promoted in his NGDO’s public proclamations.
He elaborated that ‘it [wa]s fine to develop
intellectual constructs around idealised forms of
partner inclusive governance but you can have all
the inclusive governance systems you want, if they
are not executable, they are pointless’ (D). For him,
local NGDO partners worked with and on behalf of
his NGDO at an operational level but the strategic
direction of the donor NGDO was his and the
NGDO board’s responsibility alone. While he
recognised some potential in the ideal local
partner-influenced governance scenario, he was
adamant that implementing it would lead to ‘a
potential mess in governance’ (D) that could not be
countenanced.
Leaders of top-tier NGDOs were also rather
defensive when addressing this issue. For example,
one such leader explained that he had enough
problems trying to develop an effective governance
structure as it was, without complicating matters
further by embracing local NGDO partner repre-
sentation. He indicated that he had recently been
trying to ‘cull the involvement or co-option of
people [on the NGDO board] who were strongly
emotionally committed to the organisation but
actually had no effective governance role’ (C).
This had been widely resisted by ‘older hands’ (C)
within his NGDO and attempting to embrace local
partner NGDO representation in this already heated
context was ‘not something [he had] the stomach
for’ (C) nor was he convinced it was really
necessary as he ‘wanted to move to what you
might call a more professional or less emotional
type approach to governance’ (C). He also saw little
necessity for this shift in his NGDO given that their
‘monitoring and evaluation committee’ evaluated
projects undertaken by local partners using what he
termed ‘a series of well recognised criteria that are
known in the international aid community, includ-
ing USAID and the European Union’ (C). This, he
contended, was sufficient for him without compli-
cating his life further by bringing local NGDOs into
the governance structure.
Another leader of a top-tier NGDO indicated that
as his NGDO was effectively ‘owned’ by a large
religious organisation, its ultimate governance came
from this religious authority. This meant that their
governance was heavily influenced by the religion’s
social teaching which, while rarely restricting staff
in their work, complicated the issue of bringing
local NGDO partners into its governance – espe-
cially as many might not share the organisation’s
religious ethos.While he did not wish to present this
as a highly significant barrier, he claimed that it did
make embracing local NGDO partner representa-
tion in the overall governance somewhat problem-
atic.
5.3.3. The composition of locally based NGDOs
Reinforcing the above challenges of insufficient
donor NGDO encouragement for local NGDOs to
engage in accountability dialogues with beneficiar-
ies, coupled with a reluctance or perceived inability
by some NGDOs to transfer governance influence
to local NGDOs, there was a perception that many
of the personnel in the local NGDOs might have
problems effectively ‘connecting’ with their bene-
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ficiaries in any attempted accountability dialogues.
The need to speak the rights-based approach
language, and the financial (upward) accountability
pressures placed by Irish NGDOs on their local
NGDO partners (a demand which was particularly
acute in Concern Worldwide (INTRAC, 2005: 30),
has led to many of the local NGDOs being staffed
by local, highly educated, literate individuals who
are capable of interacting easily with Irish donor
NGDOs:
‘They have to show that they can financially
account, so they need to build certain kinds of
systems, to employ certain types of people that
are able to produce reports, both narrative and
financial, of a standard that would be required by
donors.’ (K)
According to the Irish Aid interviewee (who had
previously worked for a large NGDO) and the
interviewees from all the medium-sized and small
NGDOs, the rights-based approach trend favoured
local partner NGDOs who were staffed by members
of the so-called ‘elite’ within a local society and
‘were able to speak English, interface with donors,
[and] speak the donor language’ (K). A key concern
of these interviewees was how connected this made
these individuals to the people on whose behalf they
were supposed to be working – the beneficiaries.
They were worried that this could lead to a lack of
beneficiary representativeness within many local
partner NGDOs. Given these perceived trends, the
Irish Aid interviewee asked:
‘What about their [locally based NGDOs’] actual
connectiveness to those on whose behalf they are
supposed to be working, who are marginalised,
who are living in poverty, who are often illiterate?
That for me is a huge question and I am not sure
we as donors are doing an awful lot to try and
help people find solutions to that . . . We need to
create mechanisms for local NGDOs to incenti-
vise them to develop and structure downward
accountability relationships.’ (K)
Even where some ‘connectiveness’ existed
between local NGDOs and beneficiaries, the
Dóchas interviewee expressed concern that this
connection was often framed in the context of what
local elites determined was good for their fellow
citizens, regardless of the citizens’ views. He
recalled working with local NGDO leaders in
Chad ‘who . . . developed a number of concepts
about howChadian civil society should develop and
the rights individuals should claim’ (J) with little
local consultation. He recounted that:
‘ . . . at the time I was uneasy about us implanting
these concepts and views of how locals should
develop without clear consultation as we were
sort of forcing them on [the] beneficiaries. There
was an attitude of ‘we are educated, we know best
and we will determine what your needs and rights
are as we are qualified to do so’. It was difficult to
try to get these individuals in the local NGDO to
connect with and be willing to recognise that
local beneficiaries should have some say in what
was to be done.’ (J).
A leader of a large NGDO defended his NGDO’s
reliance on so-called local elites. He claimed that
this was almost always necessary given the need for
expertise in aid delivery and that it did not
necessarily lead to less ‘success’ or accountability
to beneficiaries. He offered some examples of
situations whereby his NGDO and some influential
local leaders had targeted and trained local people
thereby directly supporting their development. The
need for well educated, literate individuals to help
educate and guide local communities who were
often lacking in basic skills and knowledge about
their fundamental rights was, in his view, often
unavoidable. Given their training they could actu-
ally aid as opposed to hinder beneficiary-led
development:
‘We have had this hugely successful reforestation
programme in Central Cambodia that had been
carpet bombed by the Americans during the
Vietnam War and was lying fallow and unused
for years. With funding from the EU and from the
Danish government we reforested that whole area
with the help of locals. We then trained the local
NGDO leaders, and through them we trained all
the villagers and they are now managing it
themselves. We have now been asked to do a
similar project. We have been approached to do it
in North Korea where we are one of the few
international NGOs operating.’ (C)
A leader of a small NGDO (G) tempered his
largely negative perspectives on the use of local
elites. He indicated that while he had seen first hand
the potentially detrimental effects of an overt
reliance on local ‘disconnected’ elites while previ-
ously working for a medium-sized NGDO, he had
to acknowledge that they could also positively
benefit communities, especially when technically
trained. He gave an example of the use of well-
educated, technically trained local people in a
community in Zambia who worked within the
community developing a water pumping system
suited to the community’s specific needs. These
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technical people used their expertise to develop and
implement the system but they also made extensive
use of local knowledge to ascertain where the best
place to install the pumps was. He indicated that
‘huge amounts of local energy’ (G) went into these
projects which complemented the educated local
NGDO contribution.
5.3.4. A lack of demand from local NGDOs and
beneficiaries
Even if the apparent challenges for effective
downward accountability revealed in the previous
three subsections were to be overcome, there was a
further perceived challenge – of a very different
nature – in implementing effective downward
accountability practices, and this is a perceived
lack of demand from local NGDOs and from their
beneficiaries for engaging in downward account-
ability dialogues.
Concern Worldwide, for example, in its initial
attempts at partnership with locally based NGDOs,
failed to include local partners in its governance
structure and management decision processes due
to claimed concerns that it might overly impose on
its local partners (see INTRAC, 2005: 29). Some
interviewees defended their lack of willingness to
include local NGDOs and beneficiaries in their
governance and decision-making structures by
referring to the risk that this could overly impose
on already stretched local NGDO partners, who
therefore had little interest in being involved in
governance issues. An interviewee from a small
NGDO claimed that that the local partner model in
her NGDO risked ‘overwhelming partners and
beneficiaries’ (H) while two other interviewees
(one from a large and one from a medium-sized
NGDO) doubted whether beneficiaries or local
partner NGDOs (representing beneficiaries) in
developing countries really wanted more account-
ability – or if it was even ‘appropriate’ (B) for them
to expect this, especially given that among many
local NGDO partners and their beneficiaries,
expertise and ‘modern’ knowledge on development
was not well developed:
‘We are dealing with social change, we are
dealing with people who are ill-equipped and
whose mentality and culture and entire ethos is
non-modern in many respects . . . How are they
to join the modern world of our governance and
on what terms?’ (D)
An interviewee from a small NGDO claimed that
local partner NGDOs were often primarily inter-
ested in receiving money to spend on basic
activities. He maintained that they ‘had got used
to dealing with donor NGOs’ (G) and merely went
through the motions of reporting back on what was
spent and where it was spent. They had little interest
in more developed relationships. However, he
emphasised that this was partly a result of donor
NGDOs not pushing them more on the level of their
representativeness of local communities.
Moreover, a large NGDO leader indicated that
the extent of civil society development had a
significant influence on the willingness of local
NGDOs to express any interest in involvement in
donor NGDO governance. In more developed civil
society contexts such as Central America he
claimed there was greater openness to involvement,
but in less developed contexts on the African
continent where most of the NGDO interviewees
worked, he claimed there was little interest in, or
confidence among local NGDOs in participating in
this manner:
‘It depends really where you are. There are some
of the areas we are working in where they would
have quite a highly developed civil society. In
Central America for example, there is a great deal
of participation generally anyway, so to get
people involved in thinking and planning in our
governance is not a difficulty there. [However], if
you go somewhere like DRC [Democratic
Republic of Congo] it is the completely opposite
end of the spectrum where the idea of participa-
tion and people getting involved is low. It doesn’t
mean they are being discouraged, dismissed and
all the rest of it, their willingness or their
confidence to participate in governance just
isn’t there.’ (B)
The task of finding a balance between enabling
more meaningful local NGDO and beneficiary
participation in decision-making as part of a
rights-based approach without overburdening
local NGDOs was one an interviewee from a
medium-sized NGDO felt was the crucial next step
for Irish donor NGDOs:
‘I think . . . the real moral challenge for this
century is moving beyond the charity model in
our relations with those we are working with in
the South. The real challenge is to find a way of
working that is genuinely equal, is genuinely
empowering, without being overburdening by
asking them to come to 95 meetings – national,
international etc.’ (D)
6. Discussion and conclusions
The efficacy with which the large and growing
amounts of development aid funding, flowing from
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richer to poorer countries, are used has a very real
impact on the basic quality of the lives (and, indeed,
the life expectancy) of large numbers of very poor
people in the developing world. It has been
recognised by some NGDOs and funders of devel-
opment aid (and in the academic literature) that
downward accountability to beneficiaries has the
potential to be an important tool in the quest to
improve the effectiveness with which finite devel-
opment aid is deployed (see, for example, Ebrahim,
2003a, 2003b; 2005). As such, it has been claimed
that downward accountability can play a key role in
the development and implementation of effective
rights-based approaches to development that are
currently being strongly promoted by donor gov-
ernments and NGDOs. In this role, appropriate
downward accountability mechanisms should help
NGDOs become learning organisations, interacting
and mutually learning with their beneficiaries (in
addition to other stakeholders) and thereby devel-
oping deeper understandings of the aid delivery
solutions that are likely to be most effective in
practice in each aid situation.
While there has been recognition of the desir-
ability and potentially beneficial impact on the
rights-based approach of forms of downward
accountability, there has been a lack of academic
study into the outcomes of attempts by development
aid funders to encourage NGDOs to develop these
forms of accountability. The main aim of this paper
has been to address this gap in the literature by
identifying and assessing the extent to which these
downward accountability mechanisms in NGDOs
have had the potential in practice to contribute to the
effectiveness of rights-based approaches to devel-
opment. Addressing this objective has advanced
prior research examining NGO accountability in the
social accountability field, where no research exists
which attempts to trace and evaluate the perceived
impact in practice of funder-initiated attempts at
fostering greater NGDO use of downward account-
ability mechanisms. In particular, the paper has
advanced O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2007) work
that examined efforts to establish a mutual account-
ability relationship between Irish Aid and the
NGDOs they fund, and which placed its primary
analytical emphasis on the upward accountability
relationship between Irish donor NGDOs and Irish
Aid. This study, in contrast, has examined the
accountability relationship between Irish donor
NGDOs and their beneficiaries, thereby focusing
exclusively on the perceived enactment of down-
ward accountability in these relationships. The
study has also added empirically to prior research
on NGO accountability in the development studies
literature, which mainly theorises the enactment of
downward accountability processes (see, Atack,
1999; Kamat, 2004). Moreover, while the limited
empirical work in this field primarily examines
contexts where key funders are perceived as
discouraging or remaining indifferent to downward
accountability (see, Kilby, 2006; Lister, 2000), this
study has examined perceptions of the practical
implementation of downward accountability in a
context where a key NGDO donor actually pro-
moted the adoption of downward accountability.
Contrary to some of the key elements of the
rights-based approach that require the embracing of
active, meaningful participation and beneficiary
direction in development programmes, analysis of
the empirical evidence in this paper did not discover
widespread evidence of consistent, substantive
operationalisation of ideal rights-based local part-
nership working relationships. This was despite the
increasing rhetoric surrounding these approaches in
Ireland, and their prioritisation as part of the MAPS
funding requirements. The impression imparted
was that the local partner models, while varying in
the extent of their application among different
NGDOs, sometimes struggled, often for a variety of
NGDO-specific reasons, to facilitate the scope to
significantly challenge the status quo of the Irish
donor NGDOs’ operations. Consequently, a key
feature of downward accountability that is needed
to support the effectiveness of the rights-based
approach – the ability of beneficiaries to effect
change in the actions of NGDOs –while considered
carefully by some NGDOs – was rarely prioritised
when assessing programme effectiveness. This was
especially evident within larger NGDOs who
appeared somewhat wary of becoming beholden
to potentially narrow constituencies.
The level of direct formal local NGDO oversight
varied between NGDOs, and was of mixed concern
for NGDO leaders. For example, leaders of large
NGDOs seemed to presume that as long as they had
established broad procedures for assessing local
NGDOs as to their suitability to deliver aid
effectively, there was no need for detailed oversight
on the ground with regard to local NGDOs’ direct
accountability to beneficiaries. The practicalities
and desirability of detailed local NGDO oversight
were questioned, especially as they could pose
resource problems for larger NGDOs, an issue that
did not seem to overly concern leaders of smaller
NGDOs. Moreover, there was a perception among
larger and medium-sized NGDO interviewees that
there already existed numerous complicated gov-
ernance issues within their organisational structures
that needed addressing, and these took precedence
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over any concerns, where they existed, to embrace
local NGDO involvement in governance. Among
some of these larger NGDO leaders, there was a
subtle tendency to discount the place and potential
of local NGDOs within donor NGDO governance.
While these governance issues did not appear to
explicitly concern smaller donor NGDOs as they
could often more easily engage directly with local
NGDOs, we also found no evidence of formal local
NGDO involvement in their governance. It is this
lack of formality that Kilby (2006) claims fails to
substantively secure rights for beneficiaries as part
of NGDO accountability processes.
Our findings also suggest that prior research has
often neglected consideration of the possibility that
local NGDOs and beneficiaries may have little
interest in being more directly involved in donor
NGDO decision-making. The presumption that
donor NGDOs possess most of the power in their
relationships with local NGDOs was not universally
held, with some interviewees suggesting that local
NGDOs could often choose from numerous com-
peting donor NGDOs and, hence, had little need or
desire to establish more formal partnership rela-
tionships – especially if these risked overburdening
them. This lack of concern with relative donor
NGDO – local NGDO power was, however, treated
sceptically by interviewees from smaller NGDOs,
who regarded it as a convenient view of power
relations consistent with a desire among some larger
NGDOs to only commit limited resources to
ensuring beneficiaries were actively involved in
guiding and assessing NGDO activity.
With respect to the issue of local NGDO-
beneficiary relations, so-called local elites were
sometimes perceived to be distant from and unrep-
resentative of beneficiary groups. While these
perceptions largely chime with the contentions of
Kamat (2004) and Atack (1999), our analysis
suggests that they must be considered in light of
the on-the-ground realities often facing local
NGDOs, whereby they may have little choice but
to locate and actively use more educated members
of communities in their attempts to deliver aid
effectively. However, it appears that unless there are
increased attempts at more direct oversight of local
NGDOs’ relations with beneficiaries, then limited
consultation and representativeness among local
elites, where it exists, may go unchecked and
possibly restrict beneficiaries from driving the focus
of development efforts more directly.
The insights above have the potential to inform
the development of more effective downward
accountability practices and thereby more effective
rights-based approaches in the NGDO sector. This
is because advance awareness of the impediments
and resistance to greater downward accountability
can be an important factor in overcoming these
obstacles to more effective rights-based approaches
to aid delivery aiming to improve the quality of life
(including life expectancy) of many people. In
particular, public funding policy needs to develop to
both further embed the growing strategic commit-
ment to greater downward accountability as part of
the rights-based approach to development by
NGDOs in donor nations, and to help transform
this commitment from its sometimes rhetorical state
to becoming more fully and consistently realised in
operational practices. As the NGDOs in this study
largely embraced the principles of the rights-based
approach to development, and rhetorically recog-
nised the need for effective downward accountabil-
ity mechanisms as part of the rights-based approach,
the combination of pressures on NGDOs outlined in
this paper seem to have been effective in developing
strategic commitments to downward accountability.
Although these pressures have been effective
specifically in the Irish context, policy makers in
other countries could look to the combination of
direct governmental pressure on NGDOs (in this
study, through the White Paper on Irish Aid, a
government report on aid expenditure, and the
MAPS process) along with fostering greater media
debate and greater public scrutiny of the effective-
ness of aid delivery – tailored to the circumstances
of each country – to put effective pressure on
NGDOs to develop commitments to downward
accountability as a key element in seeking to embed
the rights-based approach to development at a
strategic level.
However, transforming these (often apparently
rhetorical) commitments at the macro strategic level
into practice at the micro operational level appears,
from the evidence in this study, to pose additional
problems which vary among different NGDOs. In
particular, policy on governmental funding require-
ments needs to be much more focused on actively
incentivising more effective accountability mech-
anisms both between donor NGDOs and their
partner NGDOs at the local level in developing
nations, and between these local NGDOs and their
beneficiaries.
While the extent of current local NGDO over-
sight varies among NGDOs, funding requirements
and mechanisms need to provide more detailed
guidance than there is within the Irish MAPS
programme about the nature of local NGDO
oversight required from donor NGDOs, and the
consequences for donor NGDOs of not undertaking
this. Examples of possible, albeit flexible, mechan-
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isms tailored to specific NGDO contexts based on
best international practice (see, for example,
ActionAid International, 2004; The Humanitarian
Accountability Project (HAP)) could be included in
governmental funding requirements (such as the
MAPS guidance) to make more direct oversight less
problematic at a practical operational level.12 A
specific amount of funding could also be allocated
for this oversight purpose to counter NGDO
complaints about possible resource constraints.
Funded NGDOs could then be publicly assessed
by governmental funding agencies (such as Irish
Aid) as to their level of direct engagement with and
knowledge of local NGDO downward accountabil-
ity processes. These more explicit funding pro-
posals would make downward accountability more
central to assessments of effectiveness. It needs to
be recognised, however, that this suggestion is
fraught with practical challenges. For example, in
the Irish context: a perceived lack of expertise in
Irish Aid identified by O’Dwyer and Unerman
(2007); reduced funding levels as a result of the
ongoing credit crisis; the apparent attachment of
some established NGDOs to their own local partner
models; and the aforementioned lack of legitimacy
some donor NGDOs seem to possess among local
partner NGDOs. However, unless the operationali-
sation of downward accountability is prioritised
more explicitly by funding agencies such as Irish
Aid in their assessments of NGDO operations, and
more explicit, albeit flexible, assessment mechan-
isms are clearly communicated to donor NGDOs,
then the enactment of downward accountability on
the ground may vary considerably. Moreover, now
that a cultural change more focused on downward
accountability has emerged in the Irish context,
more explicit funding requirements along with
assessments using clearer, tailored guidance should
encourage funded NGDOs to reflect more critically
on how their practices are realising aspects of the
downward accountability ideal.
As this study has revealed, despite more explicit
guidance and incentives that governmental aid
funding agencies such as Irish Aid might provide,
there remain numerous practical obstacles to
achieving the downward accountability ideal within
the rights-based approach for which there are no
simple public policy solutions. Where donor
NGDOs suffer from a lack of legitimacy among
local NGDOs, they need to be actively incentivised
to become more embedded in local contexts,
especially in the initial stages of projects. While
some of our interviewees indicated that this process
was too time-consuming and resource-intensive,
greater interaction with local NGDOs (at least in the
initial stages of projects) should be required and
assessed by governmental funding agencies as part
of their funding requirements to help ensure that
these perceived issues of legitimacy are dampened
and do not act to discourage donor NGDOs from
being more insistent about downward accountabil-
ity among local NGDOs. Furthermore, while the
representative nature of local elites is contested,
their work as part of local NGDOs could also be
more formally assessed and evaluated by funding
agencies such as Irish Aid. As long as their level of
representation is carefully assessed, they should
have less opportunity to operate at variance with
beneficiary requirements (should they be inclined to
do so). We accept, however, that this suggestion is
complicated by the possibility that, in situations
where local NGDOs can choose among different
donor NGDOs, they may simply select those who
are less committed to these forms of assessment.
Attaining some consistency among international
development agencies on this issue therefore
becomes crucial, through, for example, fora such
as the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
which produced the Paris Declaration.
To conclude, we would encourage other
researchers to examine shifts in accountability in
other NGDO ‘sectors’ and contexts as it is only
through studies of this nature that we can come to
better understand the complexities involved in
trying to give voice to broader groups of stakehold-
ers. These issues are of importance, as if they can
inform the practical transformation of NGDO
accountability through their input into public policy
debates, then they have the potential to help foster
greater responsiveness by NGDOs to the needs of
their beneficiaries, and thus help to improve the
efficacy of aid delivery.
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